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Reviews of Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu are not included in this issue.
Fiji
Fiji’s long journey toward constitu-
tional reform ended in 1997 with the 
adoption of the bill amending the 1990 
constitution. This closed a chapter in 
Fiji’s history that began with the coups 
of 1987. A new era was ushered in that 
many hoped would be marked by 
political stability and progress in deal-
ing with pressing social and economic 
issues.
To some extent Fiji came full circle 
in 1997 by returning to constitutional 
consensus and Commonwealth 
membership. Much of this may be 
attributed to the leadership of Prime 
Minister Sitiveni Rabuka. By pushing 
through constitutional amendments 
that returned Fiji to a political system 
more fair and just to all citizens, the 
prime minister proved to his doubters 
and detractors that he was committed 
to a new Fiji, one built on partnership 
between the different races. Opposi-
tion Leader Jai Ram Reddy also played 
a crucial role. The close working rela-
tionship forged by these two leaders 
stands out as one of the highlights of 
the year.
This course was by no means 
smooth for either man. As Rabuka’s 
stature increased, at both national and 
international levels, rifts within his 
own party, the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei (svt) grew wider,
as did Fijian provincial and chiefly 
divisions. Meanwhile open warfare 
erupted between Reddy and the 
Labour Party leader, Mahendra 
Chaudhry.
Rabuka faced his first major chal-
lenge of the year when the Great 
Council of Chiefs met in January and 
moved to end their formal role as 
sponsor of the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei. Their aim was to 
become a more independent body, 
playing a greater part in policy formu-
lation. In what was interpreted as a 
rebuke to the prime minister, the chiefs 
alleged that they were becoming a 
“rubber stamp” of the party and the 
government. The issue seemed to fuel 
dissent against Rabuka within the 
party, with claims that he (as party 
leader) had caused a falling-out with 
the Great Council of Chiefs “by failing 
to return leadership to the chiefs” 
(Post, 29 Jan 1997, 1).
More evidence of dissent surfaced 
when it was revealed that a Malaysian 
constitutional expert and former high 
court judge, sent to Fiji to advise the 
government on the constitutional 
review, had recommended rejecting the 
1996 Reeves report on the constitution 
(Reeves, Vakatora, and Lal 1996). His 
assessment was that the report was 
“null and void” because one member 
of the Constitutional Review Commis-
sion was not impartial, the terms of 
reference were changed, and the com-
mission members were not jurists. One 
unnamed government spokesperson 
welcomed the assessment on the 
grounds that the Reeves report did not 
express the Fijian view nor secure 
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Fijian rights. But other parties, includ-
ing the National Federation Party 
(nfp), Fiji Labour Party (flp), and 
Fijian Association Party (fap), con-
demned the remarks. Opposition 
Leader Reddy described this develop-
ment as a “prelude to sabotage the 
whole review process” (Post, 29 Jan 
1997, 4).
Containing any attempt at “sabo-
tage” from members of his party 
emerged as Rabuka’s main headache in 
the first few months of 1997. His sug-
gestion in February that there be cross-
racial voting for nine seats held by the 
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei led 
to talk of a breakaway party being 
formed by dissident backbenchers. 
Rabuka threatened another election. 
As Suva hosted the World Christian 
Festival of Praise that month, the 
prime minister may well have prayed 
for a miracle to help solve Fiji’s consti-
tutional future.
The Joint Parliamentary Select 
Committee (jpsc) on the constitution, 
deliberating on the recommendations 
of the Reeves report, had by April 
reached agreement on most changes, 
except the number of open and com-
munal seats. With the prospect of con-
tinuing deadlock on the issue, the 
committee sought the intervention of 
Reddy and Rabuka. Together they 
agreed to a formula that would pro-
vide for 46 reserved (communal) seats 
and 25 open seats. This in effect 
reversed the numbers recommended by 
the Reeves report (25 communal and 
45 open). The communal seats would 
consist of 23 Fijian, 19 Indian, 3 gen-
eral elector, and 1 Rotuman.
This proposal met with strong 
opposition from within the svt caucus. 
Dissent also boiled over in the Great 
Council of Chiefs and the various pro-
vincial councils. Said one high chief 
from Rabuka’s own province, 
Cakaudrove, “We want the 1990 con-
stitution retained: no more, no less” 
(Post, 12 April 1997, 2). Eight provin-
cial councils reportedly rejected the 
Reeves report outright. The other six 
supported the report with some reser-
vations. At a meeting of the Great 
Council of Chiefs in April, it was 
agreed that a fourteen-member sub-
committee be set up to look at the pro-
vincial council recommendations on 
the Reeves report and try to tailor 
them to those of the Joint Parliamen-
tary Select Committee. It was also 
agreed that the council review the pro-
posed constitutional amendment bill 
before it was tabled in Parliament.
At the first meeting of the subcom-
mittee, Rabuka was accused of com-
mitting an “unforgivable insult” by 
telling the members of the subcommit-
tee that their role was simply to relay 
decisions of the Joint Parliamentary 
Select Committee to the Great Council 
of Chiefs. An act of disloyalty to the 
chiefs was alleged. In the words of one 
chief, “We protected him [Rabuka] by 
including the prerogative of mercy pro-
vision in the 1990 constitution” (Post, 
17 April 1997, 3).
Tensions appeared to have been 
defused in early May when the Great 
Council of Chiefs accepted recommen-
dations of its subcommittee that con-
formed closely with those being 
proposed by the Joint Parliamentary 
Select Committee. These included pro-
visions that the prime minister need 
not be a Fijian, and that the House of 
Representatives comprise 46 commu-
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nal seats (23 seats reserved for Fijians) 
and 25 open seats. However a request 
was made to Parliament to consider 
increasing Fijian seats to 28 and to 
conduct a further review of the alter-
native voting system.
On 14 May, ten years to the day 
after the first coup took place, Prime 
Minister Rabuka tabled the report of 
the Joint Parliamentary Select Com-
mittee in Parliament (jpsc 1997). As 
expected, it was a somewhat watered-
down version of the Reeves report, 
reversing the number of reserved com-
munal seats and open seats in Parlia-
ment. It also advocated an alternative 
voting system based on single-member 
constituencies rather than the multiple-
member constituencies recommended 
by the Reeves report. The Joint Parlia-
mentary Select Committee agreed with 
the Reeves report that the primary goal 
of the constitution “should be to 
encourage the formation of multi-
ethnic governments.” But it went fur-
ther by stipulating that the constitution 
include provisions that the prime min-
ister establish a multiparty cabinet, 
selected from both houses and repre-
senting a fair cross section of all 
parties. A ten-percent threshold or 
seven seats would be required for a 
cabinet post. The role of opposition 
would be played by standing commit-
tees of parliamentary backbenchers 
who would scrutinize policy and con-
sider bills referred to them. Other 
recommendations were for the provi-
sion of a Bill of Rights and a Human 
Rights Commission, which would 
educate the public about the Bill of 
Rights. For Fijian communal seats,
the committee recommended that 
provinces be the basis for constituen-
cies, except for six urban seats. 
Chapter Three of the 1990 constitu-
tion dealing with Fijian and Rotuman 
interests would be replaced by a Com-
pact of Understanding that would 
recognize individual rights as well as 
Fijian land and customary rights. 
Fijian interests would always be para-
mount over others’ in the event of con-
flict. Great Council of Chiefs nominees 
in the Senate would have a veto over 
Fijian land and customary laws. The 
Great Council of Chiefs would also 
have authority to appoint the president 
and vice-president.
The prime minister shed tears as he 
tabled the jpsc report in parliament. 
“Ten years ago I was convinced that 
there was no other way to safeguard 
the national security interests of Fiji. 
Today I can say with the same strength 
of conviction that I believe there is 
only one way. We must stand together 
[and] commit ourselves towards a 
united future” (FT, 15 May 1997, 2).
Rabuka’s apparent shift “from 
agitator to conciliator” was hailed by 
many. However some were less 
impressed. Fijian Association Party 
firebrand Ilai Kuli condemned 
Rabuka’s “crocodile tears” and called 
for the report to be burned. “I will not 
compromise Fijian rights any more,” 
he declared (Post, 15 May 1997, 2). 
Some in the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa 
ni Taukei also spoke out against the 
report. Said Inoke Kubuabola, minister 
for telecommunications, “My position 
is that any amendment to this [1990] 
constitution cannot and must not 
reduce Fijian rights and interests” (FT, 
26 June 1997, 2). At the annual gen-
eral meeting of the Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei in June (which was 
marked by a poor turnout of govern-
ment members of Parliament), it was 
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agreed that the party accept the jpsc 
report. However, party members 
would be allowed to vote on the 
changes according to their conscience. 
This decision was criticized by Reddy 
as going against a jpsc agreement that 
parties vote along party lines.
Debate in Parliament on the jpsc 
report was deferred until June to allow 
time for provincial councils and mem-
bers to review the report’s recommen-
dations and also to allow for the 
formal drafting of a bill. In addition, 
there was a need to win the blessings 
of the Great Council of Chiefs, and to 
this end history was made when Jai 
Ram Reddy was invited to address the 
chiefly forum in early June. As he was 
the first Indo-Fijian to be so invited, it 
was a gesture heavy in symbolism. 
Reddy himself described his address to 
the Great Council of Chiefs as the 
most important he had ever made. His 
speech sought to reassure the chiefs 
that the proposed constitutional 
changes strengthened rather than 
diluted Fijian interests. Indo-Fijians 
were not seeking to dominate Fijians. 
Rather, he called for an “equal part-
nership” between the races and an end 
to “the pointless cycle of inter-commu-
nal rivalry” that had characterized 
Fiji’s recent past.
Rabuka also addressed the Great 
Council of Chiefs. He described the 
1990 constitution as having “served its 
immediate purpose well”—to return 
Fiji to parliamentary rule and to ensure 
the representation of all communities 
in Parliament. But in order to secure 
the country’s peace, harmony, and eco-
nomic and social progress “we have to 
go further” (FT, 7 June 1997, 2).
A major hurdle to gaining passage 
of the Joint Parliamentary Select Com-
mittee’s recommendations was cleared 
when the Great Council of Chiefs 
agreed to endorse its report. Their sup-
port was linked to two requests: that 
when council’s appointees to the 
Senate vote on issues concerning 
entrenched (Fijian) legislation they 
reflect the wishes of the Great Council 
of Chiefs, and that the government 
continue negotiations with other 
parties to declare Fiji a Christian state. 
The second request, which had not 
been included in either the Reeves 
report or the jpsc report, attracted 
keen interest and revealed further 
Fijian divisions. Opposing the move 
were the president of the Methodist 
Church, Dr Ilaitia Tuwere, and other 
prominent theologians (although not 
the general secretary of the Methodist 
Church). The prime minister was also 
cool to the idea, while several of his 
senior ministers spoke out in favor of 
the move.
In June, as the Parliament debated 
the constitution amendment bill, more 
fractures and divisions became appar-
ent, and not only within the Soqosoqo 
ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei. The Fijian 
Association Party clearly had two 
irreconcilable views on the constitu-
tion, with two of its parliamentarians 
(Ilai Kuli and Viliame Saulekeleka) 
vociferous in their opposition to any 
change to the 1990 constitution. This 
was in stark contrast to the party’s 
“official” position—articulated by 
party leader Josevata Kamikamica—
which was to support the jpsc report.
Splits also appeared within the Fiji 
Labour Party, with party leader 
Chaudhry openly critical of recom-
mendations that Labour Party repre-
sentatives on the Joint Parliamentary 
Select Committee had endorsed. In 
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particular he was opposed to the distri-
bution of open and communal seats. 
There was some speculation that 
Labour parliamentarian Krishna Datt, 
who had supported the 25–46-seat 
formula as a member of the Joint 
Parliamentary Select Committee, might 
switch allegiance to the National 
Federation Party since his views on the 
constitution appeared closer to those 
of Reddy.
Meanwhile a shouting match 
between Reddy and Chaudhry erupted 
during debate in Parliament on the 
constitution amendment bill. 
Chaudhry accused Reddy of short-
changing the Indian people by agreeing 
to 19 instead of 20 Indian communal 
seats. Reddy retaliated by challenging 
Chaudhry to “attack him directly 
rather than through silly letters to the 
editor under various nom de plume” 
(Review, Aug 1997, 13).
Despite the acrimony and unsuc-
cessful attempts by Chaudhry to 
include amendments, the House of 
Representatives voted unanimously to 
pass the bill on 3 July. The Senate 
endorsed the bill on 10 July, and it was 
signed into law by President Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara on 25 July. It will take 
effect from July 1998, and elections 
under its new electoral provisions 
should take place by February 1999. 
The task of redrawing the electoral 
constituencies was entrusted to a three-
member Constituency Boundaries 
Commission set up in September. It 
will base its recommendations on the 
findings of the 1996 census.
The census had counted a total of 
772,655 people and, for the first time 
since 1901, ethnic Fijians outnum-
bered other races (51.1 percent of the 
population).The Indian population 
showed a marked decline over the past 
ten years (43.6 percent compared to 46 
percent in 1986). This was attributed 
mainly to emigration (an estimated 
53,800 or one in eight Indians leaving 
Fiji since 1986).
When tabling the jpsc report in 
May, Rabuka had enthusiastically pro-
moted the idea of forming a govern-
ment of national unity in the lead-up 
to the next elections. He had wanted to 
include four Indians in a new multi-
party cabinet. Reddy, however, was 
quick to distance the National Federa-
tion Party from such an arrangement, 
saying he favored staying in opposition 
until after the elections. While the 
National Federation Party was firmly 
committed to a policy of cooperation 
with the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei, it would prefer to focus on 
multiparty talks that would lead to the 
formation of a “national front coali-
tion” to contest the next elections.
A meeting took place on 21 July 
between Rabuka (representing his gov-
ernment svt–gvp [General Voters 
Party] coalition), Reddy (National 
Federation Party), and David Pickering 
(General Electors Party). Participants 
discussed plans for a multiparty coali-
tion in the next elections and agreed to 
establish an interparty committee to 
formulate policies and objectives of a 
joint platform.
The Fiji Labour Party also decided 
to stay out of the proposed govern-
ment of national unity (although there 
was some confusion over whether they 
were invited in by Rabuka at all). A 
party convention in July, however, 
revealed some differences on the issue. 
While Labour leader Chaudhry 
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opposed the party’s participation in a 
multiparty cabinet, Labour parliamen-
tarian Krishna Datt was of the view 
that the party should at least consider 
the option. Meanwhile, the Fijian 
Association Party decided to join the 
government in a coalition “without 
preconditions.” It had toyed uneasily 
with the idea of a coalition with the 
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei for 
months. While both sides expressed 
support for “Fijian unity,” neither 
seemed willing to “get into bed” with 
the other.
The announcement of the fap–svt 
coalition was the catalyst for a cabinet 
reshuffle in August. Two fap parlia-
mentarians were brought into the cabi-
net: Ratu Finau Mara as Fijian Affairs 
minister (taking over that portfolio 
from Rabuka) and Viliame Cavubati 
as assistant minister for Communica-
tion. Other key changes were to move 
Berenado Vunibobo from Finance to 
Foreign Affairs and appoint Jim Ah 
Koy to the pivotal post of finance min-
ister. Former Foreign Minister Filipe 
Bole was given a newly created post, 
minister for National Planning. (As 
Fiji’s candidate for the post of secre-
tary-general of the South Pacific 
Forum Secretariat, Bole’s tenure in 
cabinet was seen as temporary. How-
ever, it became more permanent when, 
in September, the government with-
drew his name in order to smooth the 
way for Papua New Guinea’s candi-
date, Noel Levi.)
Provincial considerations clearly 
played some part in the allocation of 
cabinet posts. However, the appoint-
ment of two Lauan fap ministers 
raised some concern that a crucial 
Fijian constituency—Naitasiri—was 
unrepresented in cabinet, which could 
be read as the government taking the 
province for granted. This concern 
proved well founded when a by-
election to fill the Naitasiri seat left 
vacant by the death of the Fijian Asso-
ciation Party’s Ilai Kuli was held in 
October. The svt–fap candidate was 
trounced by a Nationalist party can-
didate, former unionist Kavekini 
Navuso. The shock defeat was attrib-
uted in part to a successful campaign 
orchestrated by the Nationalists that 
played heavily on Fijian fears about 
the new constitution. Neither the 
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei 
nor the Fijian Association Party effec-
tively countered the propaganda 
tactics of the Nationalists. Nor did 
they provide their candidate with 
much support. Rabuka canceled a 
meeting on the campaign and did not 
visit the district. A speech on national 
radio in Fijian by the prime minister to 
explain the new constitution was also 
canceled. Only about 40 percent of 
voters took part in the election (com-
pared to the 74 percent turnout in the 
1994 election), signaling growing voter 
apathy or disillusionment with politics.
One issue that remained unresolved 
in 1997 was the future of land leases 
due to expire under the Agricultural 
Landlords and Tenants Act (alta).
The lack of progress in this area over-
shadowed politics at all levels. The 
year saw the expiry of the first batch of 
45 agricultural leases. Between 1997 
and 2005, 4837 native leases covering 
19,000 hectares will expire. This 
includes land that at present produces 
one million tonnes of cane annually. 
For the Fiji sugar industry, retaining 
this land for cane farming is vital. 
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Fijian landowners in Ba province (the 
main cane growing area) were reported 
to be favoring a return of all their land, 
in part so that they could become cane 
farmers.
An alta task force looking into the 
future of land leases recommended 
against continuing with the Agricul-
tural Landlords and Tenants Act, 
claiming that Fijian landowners had 
been denied active participation in the 
sugar industry and use of their land. It 
accused the Native Land Trust Board 
and the government of failing to pro-
tect landowner interests and promote 
opportunities for Fijians. It recom-
mended that no compensation be paid 
to tenants whose leases are not 
renewed for “unauthorized improve-
ments” to land (despite farmers’ claims 
that landowners were aware of and did 
not object to improvements). The 
question of how to compensate dis-
placed farmers remained unanswered, 
and no effort was made by the govern-
ment to acquire land that might be 
used to resettle those forced to leave 
their farms. Short-term measures 
seemed to be the easy way of dealing 
with the issue: temporary extension of 
some leases and renewal of others for 
shorter terms. In the meantime, the 
Native Land Trust Board will activate 
an alta provision giving tenants and 
itself a grace period of twelve months 
to allow time for a final decision.
The uncertainty and confusion over 
the future of cane leases had direct 
implications for the sugar industry. In 
1997 a number of signs warned that 
the industry was facing an imminent 
crisis. Most critical perhaps was the 
continuing drop in revenue against 
escalating costs. It is expected that 
sugar production for 1997 will be 
100,000 tonnes less than in 1996, 
resulting in a loss of earnings of f$60 
million. This will mean a major reduc-
tion in income for the country’s 
twenty-two thousand cane farmers in 
1998. Nobody in the industry was 
willing to shoulder responsibility for 
this state of affairs. Adverse weather, 
an excessive supply of burnt cane lead-
ing to lower sugar content, mill ineffi-
ciencies, and industrial disputes were 
all blamed.
In order to deal with the underlying 
structural problems facing the indus-
try, the Fiji Sugar Commission adopted 
a strategic plan titled “Changing Atti-
tudes.” Compiled by an overseas con-
sultant, it calls for a number of major 
changes aimed at making the industry 
more efficient and competitive. These 
include mechanized harvesting, a qual-
ity cane payment system, a shorter har-
vesting season, and heavy reinvestment 
in the mills and transport system. 
However, one of the largest farmers’ 
bodies, the National Farmers’ Union, 
strongly opposed any action. Its gen-
eral secretary, Mahendra Chaudhry, 
maintained that there should be no dis-
cussion on the strategic plan until the 
future of land leases was finalized.
The survival of the sugar industry 
also depends on the future of its over-
seas markets under the Lomé Conven-
tion’s preferential trading agreement. 
The current Lomé Convention expires 
in 2001. In 1997 Prime Minister 
Rabuka assumed a prominent interna-
tional role in leading negotiations with 
the European Union as president of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Coun-
cil of Ministers. It was also a busy year 
for the prime minister in other areas of 
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foreign affairs. This included a visit to 
Croatia in March to visit Fiji’s police 
officers stationed there on peacekeep-
ing duties. While in Croatia Rabuka 
intervened in the escalating Sandline 
crisis in Papua New Guinea. He 
reportedly called General Jerry Singi-
rok twice to offer his advice on ending 
the standoff. In April Rabuka had an 
audience with the president of France 
while on a visit to Paris. On this 
occasion President Chirac sought
to influence the Fiji government
into reconsidering the purchase of 
Airbus planes (instead of the preferred 
Boeing). In May Fiji hosted the leaders’ 
summit of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (at the prime minister’s home-
town of Savusavu). Delegates pledged 
to support Fiji’s bid to rejoin the Com-
monwealth. This occasion was over-
shadowed somewhat by controversy 
surrounding excessive partying by 
delegates and the need for the govern-
ment to seek an additional f$70,000 
to cover the costs of holding the meet-
ing. A delegation (led by the prime 
minister and including the opposition 
leader) traveled to Edinburgh for the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government 
summit in October, following Fiji’s 
readmission. The path to Edinburgh 
had been smoothed by a visit to India 
by Jai Ram Reddy in September. 
Following the visit, the Indian govern-
ment announced its support for Fiji’s 
membership of the Commonwealth. 
Rabuka then invited India to reopen its 
diplomatic mission in Suva, an invita-
tion that New Delhi reciprocated.
Government expenditure was a 
prominent political issue throughout 
1997. Controversies ranged from the 
army overspending its budget by f$8 
million, to the government buying its 
cabinet ministers new Mitsubishi 
Pajeros, to the number of overseas 
trips that members of Parliament and 
civil servants enjoyed (for example, a 
six-member parliamentary delegation 
to Cairo that cost f$87,000). The 
problem of overspending caused 
Finance Minister Vunibobo to seek 
Parliament’s approval in July for an 
additional f$24 million. This brought 
the 1997 net deficit to between 10 and 
11 percent of gross domestic product. 
On 5 September the government 
secured approval for an extra f$131 
million to cover state expenditure.
The 1998 budget, handed down in 
November by new Finance Minister 
Jim Ah Koy, had as its overriding goal 
the reduction of the government’s net 
deficit. This would be achieved prima-
rily through sales of government assets 
(for example 29 percent of its shares in 
Air Pacific), corporatization of govern-
ment utilities (Telecom Fiji, Fiji Elec-
tricity Authority, water, and sewerage), 
and dividend transfers from public 
enterprises, better collection of reve-
nue, and an increase in alcohol, 
tobacco, and fuel taxes. It projected a 
1.7 percent deficit for 1998, with 
f$100 million being channeled from 
asset sales to finance the government 
debt. This target was viewed with 
skepticism by nfp spokesman, former 
university lecturer Dr Wadan Narsey, 
who questioned the prudence of selling 
government assets to pay for the debt.
Equally controversial was the deci-
sion to increase tariffs on imported 
goods that were also produced locally. 
This was justified as a way to help 
local manufacturers adjust to foreign 
competition and to offset the high cost 
432 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998
of doing business in Fiji. However, the 
move was criticized as promoting fur-
ther inefficiency and going against the 
recommendations of the government’s 
own committee on deregulation 
(whose 60-page report had been 
released in September).
The finance minister predicted a 1 
percent growth rate for 1997 and 3.8 
percent for 1998. But as economic 
indicators worsened, these figures 
looked increasingly optimistic. The 
country was hit by low gold prices, 
stagnant exports (especially of gar-
ments and sugar), and loss of competi-
tiveness in the face of currency 
depreciation in Asia, Australia, and 
New Zealand. Early in the new year 
(1998), the Reserve Bank of Fiji 
announced a dramatic 20 percent 
devaluation of the Fiji currency. Many 
expected that this move would make 
the 1998 budget targets even more 
unrealistic and lead to further pres-
sures to reduce government spending.
The budget was described by some 
observers as a preelection budget, 
aimed at winning voters through 
increased payouts to health, education, 
and poverty alleviation, as well as allo-
cations to fight crime and corruption, 
and to resettle farmers displaced under 
the Agricultural Landlords and 
Tenants Act. This will make it difficult 
to implement additional cuts, espe-
cially given the increased hardship that 
many will face as a result of the cur-
rency devaluation. The year 1998 is 
thus likely to be dominated by conflict 
over economic policy.
Relations between the National 
Federation Party and the Labour Party 
fell to a new low at the end of the year 
with the leaking to the media in 
December of the contents of an audit 
report into parliamentary allowances. 
It alleged that fifteen members, includ-
ing Leader of the Opposition Reddy, 
Speaker of House of Representatives 
Dr Kurisaqila, and Fijian Association 
Party Minister Ratu Finau Mara, were 
paid housing and travel allowances 
totaling f$178,000 to which they were 
not entitled. Chaudhry called for all 
those cited in the audit report to 
“explain themselves” to the auditor 
general and to the public. Ratu Finau 
promptly announced that he would 
resign his cabinet post until an investi-
gation had been carried out. The 
National Federation Party, however, 
accused the Labour Party of having a 
hand in leaking the report in order to 
mount a smear campaign against the 
opposition leader. Reddy alleged a 
“clandestine arrangement whereby the 
reports go to a political party, then to 
the Fiji Times, then the Auditor Gen-
eral, and then to parliament” (FT, 16 
Dec 1997, 3). In a barely disguised 
reprisal, reports soon surfaced that 
overseas trips made by Mahendra 
Chaudhry, accompanied by a female 
journalist, were being queried in order 
to establish who had paid for the 
travel.
Ratu Finau’s decision to quit 
cabinet had the support of his party 
colleagues. But this was not the case a 
week later when he announced that he 
would resume his duties as minister for 
Fijian Affairs, following the auditor 
general’s clarification on allowances, 
which appeared to clear him of any 
wrongdoing. Declared fap leader 
Kamikamica, “I don’t understand 
what is happening at the moment” (FT, 
23 Dec 1997, 1). All was not well in 
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the fap–svt coalition, and this seemed 
to be confirmed when in late Decem-
ber Adi Kuini Speed announced her 
resignation as chair of the Fijian Asso-
ciation Party. Her reasons were prima-
rily linked to poor health. However, 
there were also reports of discord in 
the party over the ongoing coalition 
with the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni 
Taukei.
After a decade of national pain and 
recrimination, there was a certain 
irony in the way 1997 ended. A 
spokesman for the Taukei Move-
ment—the archnationalist Fijian 
movement that had strongly backed 
the coups—called for 1998 to be “a 
year of reconciliation and the true 
crossroads where Fijians and Indians 
leave aside their racial differences.” He 
also advocated the renewal of land 
leases to Indian tenant farmers (Post, 
30 Dec 1997, 2). Meanwhile a poll 
conducted by the Fiji Times found that 
more Indians preferred Rabuka as 
prime minister to Reddy or any other 
candidate. Rabuka remained the over-
all favorite among the different races, 
followed by Kamikamica, Reddy, and 
Chaudhry.
If 1998 is to build on the reconcilia-
tion that marked the past year, it will 
require even greater efforts by the 
country’s leaders. Reaching a political 
agreement on the constitution was per-
haps the easy part. Now that is over, 
the hard part—making that agreement 
work and making the economy 
work—is about to start.
sandra tarte
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Irian Jaya
The Human Development Index pub-
lished in the Indonesian Central 
Bureau of Statistics’ 1996 Social Eco-
nomic National Survey placed Irian 
Jaya near the bottom of the provincial 
table, above only East Timor and West 
Nusa Tenggara. Government statistics 
are notoriously inscrutable—Irian Jaya 
also appears as the province with the 
second highest non-oil income per 
capita (due almost entirely to the pres-
ence of the Freeport mine)—but the 
bureau’s rating does appear to capture 
fairly precisely the persistent lack of 
infrastructure in Irian Jaya. These 
shortcomings were starkly exposed 
during 1997, as the numbers of deaths 
in Irian Jaya attributed to the drought 
of 1997–98 induced by the El Niño 
southern oscillation exceeded the total 
for all of Indonesia’s other provinces 
combined. The worst drought in more 
than a century combined cruelly with 
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an international collapse of confidence 
in the Suharto regime and the Indone-
sian rupiah, which finished 1997 as the 
worst-performing currency in the 
world and placed many Irianese in a 
perilous position as 1998 began.
Several locations in Irian Jaya began 
to experience unusually dry weather as 
early as January 1997; by May the 
drought had begun in earnest, and by 
August most of the province was expe-
riencing at least some problems with 
the supply of food and water. Early 
warnings of an exceptional El Niño 
event issued in July by the Department 
of Meteorology in Jakarta went 
unheeded, and the failings of the coun-
try’s heavily centralized bureaucracy 
were swiftly exposed when the underfi-
nanced and poorly equipped provincial 
administration was confronted with 
the first reports of massive mortality in 
September.
Unlike neighboring Papua New 
Guinea, where severe drought and 
famine were widespread, the worst 
effects of the drought were experienced 
in a relatively circumscribed area of 
Irian Jaya, consisting of the eastern 
half of the central range and its south-
ern slopes, as far east as the border 
with Papua New Guinea. At altitudes 
above 2,200 meters, such as the settled 
Kwiyawagi and Agadugume areas of 
the West Baliem River watershed, a 
series of frosts devastated the garden 
crops and destroyed most of the tree 
crops, leaving thousands almost 
instantly without food. Minor frosts 
are a relatively common occurrence, 
and the local administration for the 
Jayawijaya Regency at Wamena was 
prepared to some extent for the news 
of food shortages from Kwiyawagi; 
but as further reports from more iso-
lated and low-lying locations were 
received, some of the magnitude of the 
impending disaster became apparent. 
The announcement in mid-September 
by the regent of Jayawijaya, J B Wenas, 
of 138 apparently drought-related 
deaths in his regency was the first offi-
cial recognition of the devastating 
impact of the drought.
By the end of September, reports 
from Merauke Regency, where 11 
people had died, brought the provin-
cial total to 265 drought-related 
deaths. The number of deaths climbed 
above 500 in October and, by the end 
of 1997, as many as 673 people in five 
regencies (Jayawijaya, Merauke, 
Nabire, Mimika Timur, and Puncak 
Jaya) were reported to have died as a 
direct result of the drought and ensu-
ing famine. Several factors complicate 
the interpretation of this figure: 
ground-checking of the earlier reports 
from Jayawijaya suggested that the 
totals from some localities represented 
all known deaths, and included people 
dead for a number of years. Against 
this tendency to inflate totals in order 
to convey a sense of urgency about the 
situation must be weighed the fact that 
many deaths have almost certainly 
gone unreported. Detailed surveys 
during November by a joint team
from the International Committee for 
the Red Cross and PT Freeport Indone-
sia’s Malaria Control Unit in the 
Mapnduma area of Jayawijaya 
Regency revealed 103 previously un-
reported deaths, including astonishing 
mortality rates of approximately 20 
percent for two communities and 
malaria infection rates of 90-to-100 
percent in other communities not usu-
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ally exposed to the disease. Similar 
results may later be documented in 
equally remote locations along the 
southern fall of the central range.
Thus far, mortality attributed to 
poor water supply, respiratory ill-
nesses, and the spread of malaria to 
higher altitudes appears to have 
accounted for most of the deaths. Fail-
ing food supply certainly contributed 
to the weakened conditions of many 
communities, but it is feared that the 
worst effects of the famine that has 
followed the drought may not be expe-
rienced until 1998. The delivery of 
food and medical aid was hampered 
from August until November by the 
heavy smoke haze that obscured much 
of the central range and its southern 
slopes. Vast areas of alpine scrub and 
lower montane forest in the Lorentz 
National Park were consumed by fire 
in August and September, and in indi-
vidual incidents elsewhere people were 
caught and killed in house fires. Rain 
finally fell in many parts of Irian Jaya 
during November and December, 
relieving water supply problems and 
allowing crops to be planted for the 
first time in up to seven months. How-
ever, local climatic variations in the 
highlands have seen rainfall and water 
supply problems persist into 1998 in 
certain areas, and the lapse between 
planting and harvest of the first signifi-
cant crops will place many communi-
ties at risk of starvation.
Relief efforts in Irian Jaya were 
coordinated by a central government 
body, Satkorlak, established at a pro-
vincial level in Jayapura and matched 
by at least two regency-level Satlak 
committees for Jayawijaya and for the 
three regencies (Puncak Jaya, Paniai, 
and Nabire) newly constituted from 
the former regency of Nabire. Of 
these, the most efficient was undoubt-
edly the Jayawijaya committee under 
the energetic leadership of Regent 
Wenas. But much of the actual delivery 
of aid rested with the Missionary Avia-
tion Fellowship, which committed 
most of its modest resources to the 
tasks of both ferrying food and medi-
cal aid, and coordinating their distri-
bution. Fellowship pilots with previous 
experience in the region were recalled 
from overseas, as were former mission-
aries to conduct surveys in areas with 
which they were already familiar. 
Although the military provided 
Hercules aircraft to fly rice and other 
materials into the major highlands 
center of Wamena, further distribu-
tion relied heavily on the light Cessna 
planes of the Missionary Aviation 
Fellowship, together with up to four 
helicopters, two supplied by the army, 
one by the fellowship, and one by PT 
Freeport Indonesia.
Toward the end of the year, interna-
tional appeals launched on behalf of 
Irian Jaya by the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, the United 
Nations Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs, and World Vision had raised 
substantial sums of money. A signifi-
cant proportion of the aid delivery 
effort was assumed by World Vision 
Indonesia, whose staff have extensive 
experience in the province. Not until 
December, however, after news had 
broken of the shocking mortality docu-
mented by the Red Cross, did Presi-
dent Suharto finally instruct Ginandjar 
Kartasasmita, the state minister for 
planning, to coordinate a national 
response to the famine in Irian Jaya. 
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The funds for this relief have appar-
ently been guaranteed by Jakarta, irre-
spective of further developments in the 
national financial crisis.
In addition to the other agencies, 
the International Committee for the 
Red Cross secured permission in 
November to reenter and supply aid to 
the Mapnduma area, where it had 
played a key role in 1996 in the (ulti-
mately unsuccessful) negotiations for 
the release of hostages taken by the 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (opm) 
movement. Following the release of the 
hostages in May 1996, the Mapnduma 
area had been closed off by the mili-
tary, who offered a financial reward 
for information leading to the arrest of 
the opm commander, Kelly Kwalik. 
Books published separately during 
1997 by two of the hostages, Adinda 
Saraswati and Daniel Start, provided 
highly contrasting accounts of their 
1996 experiences, but almost nothing 
could be known of the fate of the 
Nduga and eastern Amungme commu-
nities who occupied the area in which 
the hostage drama was played out. The 
return of the International Commis-
sion for the Red Cross to Mapnduma 
in 1997 has begun to throw some light 
on events after the hostage release, and 
the results of their preliminary surveys 
suggest that the famine and excep-
tional mortality experienced in the 
area owed as much to the dislocation 
of the hostage crisis and its aftermath 
as to the 1997 drought.
The huge influx of military to the 
Mapnduma and Timika areas follow-
ing this and other hostage-taking 
events during 1996 appears to have 
reduced opm activity to those areas 
immediately bordering Papua New 
Guinea. The Trans-Irian Highway (the 
Jayapura-Wamena section of which 
was formally opened by President 
Suharto later in September) was tar-
geted in April, when a party of survey-
ors was attacked and one of them 
killed. But the principal events involv-
ing the Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
during 1997 were the series of mass 
surrenders in the Merauke Regency 
during May, which were widely 
reported in the national media. The 
significance of these surrenders 
remains unclear, accompanied as they 
have been by considerable numbers of 
Irianese crossing the border into south-
ern Papua New Guinea, and, during 
December and January 1998, even 
fleeing by boat to islands in the Torres 
Strait. However, the simultaneous 
capture of opm leaders just across the 
border by PNG police suggests a 
heightened degree of cooperation 
between Indonesian and PNG 
authorities.
This was also an election year in 
Indonesia, as the country voted for 
representatives to the national Parlia-
ment. Elections have not been closely 
contested in Indonesia for more than 
thirty years, and in 1997 the ruling 
golkar party managed to increase its 
national vote to 74.5 percent (exceed-
ing both its target of 70.02 percent and 
the 68.1 percent of the vote it attracted 
in the 1992 elections). In Irian Jaya, 
despite the ousting of the popular 
national party leader, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian Demo-
cratic Party retained its traditional 
second-place position, with 7.5 percent 
of the vote, behind golkar, which 
managed a massive 88.9 percent. 
Reports of government manipulation 
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of the ballot system were widespread, 
ranging from inducements offered to 
returning refugees in return for their 
vote, through to government-
sponsored “education” programs that 
instructed people how to vote for 
golkar. In an otherwise predictable 
result, the principal talking point in 
Irian Jaya was the revolt by the provin-
cial golkar branch in Jayapura, 
which defied its head office in Jakarta 
by voting in as provincial council 
chairman the army faction’s nominee, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Sitorus, 
rather than the party’s designated 
candidate, Nathaniel Kaiway. 
Attempts by an embarrassed party 
secretariat to discipline the unruly 
branch members were ultimately over-
ruled by cabinet ministers.
Of more consequence for Irian Jaya 
in the long run will be the 1998 presi-
dential elections and, specifically, the 
identity of the new vice-president. One 
of the leading candidates for the post is 
B J Habibie, the current state minister 
for research and technology and ener-
getic advocate of the proposed mega-
development project in the vast 
Mamberamo Valley in Irian Jaya. The 
overall cost of the Mamberamo 
project, which received the backing of 
six state ministers in October, is esti-
mated at us$120 billion, grand even 
by Habibie’s standards. Plans for the 
project center on a hydroelectric dam 
across the Mamberamo River, and a 
100,000 square kilometer area set 
aside for large-scale agro-industrial 
development (principally rice and oil 
palm) and heavy industry (aluminium, 
steel, copper, petrochemical, pulp and 
paper plants, and a shipyard), the 
power for which will be generated by 
natural gas from the newly discovered 
Bintuni Bay gas fields (discussed later). 
The preliminary results from feasibility 
studies on twelve of the component 
industries, conducted during 1997 by 
the German companies Siemens, 
Hochtief, and Ferrostahl, were 
presented at a closed seminar in 
December.
Whether the project proceeds or 
not, the fate of the Mamberamo area 
and many of the other low-lying or 
coastal expanses in Irian Jaya appears 
to be sealed by the government’s vigor-
ous support for oil-palm development 
in the province. Of 9.1 million hectares 
allocated for oil-palm plantations 
across Indonesia in 1996, 5.6 million 
were in Irian Jaya alone (ICN, 16 Feb 
1998). To a significant extent, lack of 
infrastructure in Irian Jaya has 
deterred investors from pursuing these 
opportunities, and the government has 
turned instead to joint ventures 
between private companies and the 
Department of Transmigration, in 
which the latter essentially provides 
labor and basic infrastructural require-
ments such as road access to the indus-
try. In October the Mamberamo area 
was also formally designated the 
second of President Suharto’s one-
million-hectare “Agricultural Parks” 
(Down to Earth, May 1997, 8–9). 
Although planning details have not 
been released, development of the 
Mamberamo area will presumably 
match that of the Kapuas peat-land 
project in central Kalimantan, where 
the transfer of up to one million trans-
migrants from Java is similarly linked 
to oil-palm plantation development. 
To some extent, realization of either 
the Habibie or Suharto plans for the 
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Mamberamo area hinge on the future 
recovery of the rupiah, but the piece-
meal spread of oil-palm development 
linked to transmigration may, over 
time, achieve a result comparable to 
that envisaged for the more spectacular 
projects. The benefits of these plans for 
the scattered communities resident in 
the Mamberamo area have generally 
been assumed by planners in Jakarta 
and Jayapura, but there appears to 
have been little consultation or even 
analysis of the likely social impacts of 
development on this scale.
Estimates of the considerable natu-
ral gas reserves in Bintuni Bay, discov-
ered during 1996 by Atlantic Richfield 
(arco) and British Gas, continued to 
rise during 1997. Arco’s proven and 
probable reserves at the Tangguh field 
reached 13 trillion cubic feet, with a 
further 6.5 trillion cubic feet in possi-
ble reserves, the largest gas field in 
eastern Indonesia and more than suffi-
cient to initiate plans for the develop-
ment of two gas trains in Irian Jaya, in 
a joint venture with the state-owned 
oil company, Pertamina. British Gas, 
which holds a 50 percent stake in a 
smaller gas field adjacent to Tangguh, 
will collaborate with arco to develop 
the fields jointly. Development of the 
Tangguh field will now leapfrog the 
planned development of Indonesia’s 
larger but more expensive Natuna
field in the South China Sea, which
has failed to find sufficient financial 
backing.
The mining industry continues to 
dominate the non-oil sector of Irian 
Jaya’s economy, the Freeport mine 
alone accounting for over 88 percent 
of the value of the province’s exports. 
Fifteen new “sixth generation” Con-
tracts of Work for mining exploration 
concessions in Irian Jaya were signed 
by the national government in April, a 
significant addition to the six existing 
concessions (two of which are held by 
Freeport and its Irja Eastern Minerals 
subsidiary). The most prominent of 
these new concessions include: the 
investment of BHP Minerals in further 
exploration of the large nickel deposit 
on Gag Island in a joint venture with 
the state mining company PT Aneka 
Tambang; the feasibility studies for 
mineral sand mining along a 250 
kilometer length of the north coast of 
Irian Jaya in a joint venture between 
Austpac Gold and Indomin; and the 
portfolio of seven exploration conces-
sions, held in joint ventures between 
Iriana Resources, Barrick Gold, 
Cyprus Amax, and Battle Mountain 
Gold, which cover a total of 6.22 
million hectares in northern Irian Jaya. 
Mining on a different scale occurred in 
Nabire Regency during late 1996 and 
early 1997, when an alluvial gold rush 
developed in the hinterland of Nabire 
township. Evident success on the part 
of up to twenty thousand people in 
panning for gold was brought to a halt 
just prior to the elections, when the 
security forces placed restrictions on 
movement to the area of the find.
PT Freeport Indonesia’s copper-gold 
operation remains the only actual mine 
in Irian Jaya, and its considerable size 
and national significance continue to 
cast a long shadow over other events 
in the province. During 1997, Freeport 
announced an increase in its gold 
reserves to 108 million ounces, valued 
at us$35.5 billion, confirming its sta-
tus as the world’s largest gold resource, 
in addition to its reputation as the 
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world’s third-largest copper deposit. In 
December, Freeport’s regional amdal 
environmental impact report received 
approval from the minister for envi-
ronment, allowing the company to 
increase its mill throughput from a 
current rate of about 120,000 to as 
much as 300,000 metric tonnes per 
day. Despite these successes, the com-
pany was hit by the global slump in 
copper and gold prices, which led to a 
drop of 49.6 percent in its share value 
during 1997. Shares in the parent com-
pany, Freeport McMoRan Copper & 
Gold, were consequently identified as 
the fifth worst performing stock of the 
year in the United States, and Standard 
& Poor responded by downgrading 
the company’s rating, “with negative 
implications.” Ironically, the uncertain 
political climate and declining value of 
the rupiah that Standard & Poor cited 
in its downgrading have been of finan-
cial benefit to the company through 
savings on the salaries of its Indone-
sian staff.
Freeport’s highest profile in the 
media during 1997 derived from its 
involvement in the uncovering of
the world’s largest-ever mining fraud, 
the fiasco over the supposed Busang 
motherlode “discovered” by Cana-
dian exploration company Bre-X in 
Kalimantan. Freeport’s introduction to 
the Busang site, a surprise move on the 
part of the government after a pro-
tracted battle between other mining 
companies whose competing interests 
had been represented by Suharto’s own 
children, came by courtesy of its new-
found relationship with Bob Hasan 
and the Nusamba group. A key confi-
dante of President Suharto and proxy 
manager of many of the president’s 
business interests, Hasan had success-
fully induced Bakrie Brothers to part 
with their control over a 9.6 percent 
stake in PT Freeport Indonesia in Janu-
ary, selling out to the Nusamba group, 
which is owned jointly by Hasan, Sigit 
Harjojudanto (Suharto’s eldest son), 
and three foundations presided over by 
Suharto. Nusamba’s acquisition of the 
stake was then guaranteed by Freeport. 
Industry observers cast some doubt on 
Bakrie Brothers’ claim that the move 
was a strategic shift to more profitable 
core enterprises, noting that its Free-
port share was the company’s single 
most profitable investment, by a com-
fortable margin. When Hasan emerged 
as the president’s chosen “fixer” for 
the knotty question of the eventual 
ownership of Busang, Freeport were 
swiftly selected as operators for the 
project. Although Freeport geologists 
conducting due diligence drilling were 
instrumental in exposing Busang as a 
worthless property, its core samples 
having been salted by Bre-X staff, 
Freeport became a target for intense 
criticism from Amien Rais, leader of 
the Islamic Muhammadiyah organiza-
tion, for the generosity of the terms of 
its contract with the government.
The numerous social problems in 
the Timika and Tembagapura areas 
surrounding Freeport’s mine in Irian 
Jaya remained intractable during 
1997. Though the environmental 
claims included in the lawsuit brought 
against Freeport in the New Orleans 
District Court by Amungme leader 
Tom Beanal were dismissed in April, 
Beanal’s counsel, Martin Regan, 
promptly re-filed an amended suit 
focusing on human rights claims. This 
amended suit was itself rejected, and
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indicating the continuing opposition of 
the Amungme community to the cur-
rent form of its relationship with the 
company.
In particular, Freeport’s attempts to 
compensate the Amungme and 
Kamoro communities indigenous to its 
main area of operations have met with 
strong opposition. The Integrated 
Timika Development or “pwt2” 
Project initiated jointly by the com-
pany and the government has become 
a focus for strife between community 
and company, and among different 
ethnic communities pitted against one 
another for a share of the benefits. In 
August, a public letter signed by the 
leaders of each of the churches repre-
sented in the Timika area rejected
the current structure of the pwt2 
project, calling on the company and 
the government to acknowledge the 
prior rights of the Amungme and 
Kamoro people and compensate them 
accordingly.
Also contributing to tension in the 
Freeport area has been the continued 
build-up of military strength in the 
Timika area. Armed Forces Com-
mander Feisal Tanjung confirmed that 
the Timika Military District Command 
(kodim), which was reinforced in 
September by six Panzer V-150 
armored cars (Suara Pembaruan, 9 Sep 
1997), now contains the greatest con-
centration of troops in the country. In 
January 1997, war broke out between 
the Amungme landowners and immi-
grant Dani and Damal people living in 
settlements in the Tembagapura area. 
A total of seven Dani were killed in the 
fighting before the military finally 
intervened and forced a truce on the warring parties, setting the tone for an 
uneasy year. Conflict in the community 
boiled over again in the area of the 
lowland town of Timika in March, 
when four people died in a second 
clash between Dani and Amungme. 
Community rivalries and tension asso-
ciated with the payment of royalties 
from the PWT2 project came to a head 
in August, when the mysterious kill-
ings of two young Ekari people, Nela 
Pakage and Akulian Kotouki, pro-
voked riots in the settlement of 
Kwamki Lama. In the ensuing con-
frontation between security forces and 
the community, two more people were 
shot dead by soldiers. If it is possible to 
find evidence of hope at the conclusion 
of such a year, it is perhaps in the 
increase in activity in Irian Jaya of 
international agencies such as the 
International Committee for the Red 
Cross (together with the Indonesian 
Red Cross) and unesco, whose pres-
ence may ultimately contribute to a 
more open and transparent political 
and social environment in the coming 
year.
chris ballard
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New Caledonia
Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Eloi Machoro, 
and other Kanak nationalists gave 
their lives in the 1980s for the cause of 
independence from France, but as a 
1998 referendum on sovereignty nears, 
the Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste (flnks) is offering 
a compromise to French loyalists in 
New Caledonia: independence “in 
association” with France. The rhetoric 
of self-determination is still strong, but 
for the past year the flnks has envi-
sioned 1998 as only the beginning of a 
transitional devolution of authority 
from Paris. President Bernard Lepeu of 
the Union Calédonienne (uc), the larg-
est party in the flnks coalition, views 
this strategy as the “only way to recon-
cile the Kanak desire for independence 
with the desire of loyalists and Paris 
for French representation in the 
region” (ran, 9 Feb 1997). However, 
an impasse in negotiations over the 
Kanak acquisition of a key nickel mine 
was a major stumbling block to prepa-
rations for the referendum, which 
should take place sometime between 
March and December 1998, according 
to the Matignon Accords (Maclellan 
1997).
Jacques Lafleur, millionaire leader 
of the loyalist Rassemblement pour la 
Calédonie dans la République (rpcr), 
who signed the Matignon Accords 
with Tjibaou a decade ago, has been calling for a “consensual solution” 
based on a thirty-year pact, rather than 
leaving the sovereignty issue up to next 
year’s referendum. His opposition to 
independence, expressed even in delay-
ing actions in the Territorial Congress 
on tax bills that would finance projects 
in the Kanak-controlled Northern 
Province, has coincided with disagree-
ment between the two leading indepen-
dence groups, the uc-dominated flnks 
and the Parti de Libération Kanak 
(Palika; Maclellan 1997). Palika split 
from the flnks in the 1995 elections, 
and although its most prominent 
leader, Paul Néaoutyine, heads the 
team bargaining with France over 
Kanak mineral rights in the Northern 
Province, Palika prefers to prioritize 
political discussions over mining issues 
(ran, 28 Jan 1997).
In contrast, Lepeu and Rock 
Wamytan, president of the rump 
flnks, have most actively pursued the 
creation of a Northern nickel-process-
ing plant, a project that in turn is 
linked to an exchange of mining sites 
with the giant Société le Nickel (sln), 
of which the French state owns a 
majority of shares. After difficult bar-
gaining in late 1996, eramet, the 
holding company that controls the 
Société le Nickel, had offered to 
exchange its Koniambo nickel site for 
the Kanak-owned site at Poum in the 
Northern Province. But the implemen-
tation of that proposal soon stalled, 
because eramet argued that the 
Koniambo site was worth much more 
than that at Poum and that a direct 
exchange without additional compen-
sation would consequently be unfair. 
The Société le Nickel, which operates 
80 percent of the active nickel mines in 
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Koniambo contained one-third of all 
the reserves in the territory and that by 
2010 it would provide half the ore 
processed at its Doniambo plant in 
Noumea (ran, 27 Feb 1997).
The avowed goal of the flnks is to 
rectify the “disequilibrium” in 
resource distribution in the territory. 
Noumea, the capital, is located in the 
more populous, multi-ethnic and loyal-
ist South and has the only nickel-
processing plant, whereas the Kanak-
controlled North is less developed 
economically and regularly loses 
unemployed young Kanak migrants to 
Lafleur’s domain. The Northern 
Province has attracted potential invest-
ment from Falconbridge, a Canadian 
firm, to help its own Société Minérale 
Sud Pacifique (smsp) build the pro-
posed new facility and thus deliver five 
hundred more jobs to local Kanak. 
Having first asked for a concession at 
Tiébaghi, just north of Koumac, a port 
the North is developing to attract 
people away from Noumea, the flnks 
finally accepted eramet’s offer of 
Koniambo, despite the fact that the site 
was located in the center-west of 
Grande Terre and technically in the 
rpcr-dominated Southern Province.
Didier Leroux, leader of the dissi-
dent loyalist party Une Nouvelle-Calé-
donie Pour Tous (unct), has voiced 
support for the smsp plant but also 
regards the exchange of Koniambo for 
Poum as unequal, and has expressed 
concern about the socialist ideas of the 
flnks. Nicole Waia of Radio Djiido, 
the radical Kanak station in Noumea, 
explained that the flnks needed the 
ore vein first, in order to develop the 
capital necessary for development—and by implication, possible compen-
sation. Meanwhile, rising demand for 
stainless steel in Asia caused another 
Canadian firm, inco, to propose a 
mine at Yaté in the South, which it 
hopes will produce 30,000 tonnes of 
nickel and cobalt annually by the year 
2000 (ran, 7 Mar 1997, 3 Apr 1997; 
NC, 9 July 1997).
In February, the flnks voted at its 
congress to insist that the immediate 
exchange of the two mining sites be a 
precondition for further political talks 
about 1998. This led the French minis-
ter of industry to intervene directly to 
speed up the process and make sure the 
Northern plant “sees the light of day.” 
The French state even threatened to 
abrogate the Société le Nickel’s title to 
Koniambo, despite its twenty-two-year 
mining operation at that site. Eramet 
then threatened to undertake legal pro-
ceedings in its own defense and criti-
cized Falconbridge for conducting no 
feasibility studies on the proposed 
smsp project. To step up the pressure 
on Paris, the flnks staged a three-
week blockade of the Koniambo site in 
March. As Mayor Marcel Nedia of 
Koné said, “Independence can’t be 
conceived of without mastering the 
economy of our country.” But Palika 
and the uc’s partner in the rump 
flnks, the Union Progressiste 
Mélanésienne (upm), did not partici-
pate in the anti-sln protests (ran, 24–
25 Feb 1997, 19–20 Mar 1997; NC, 31 
May 1997). In April, the Union Syndi-
cale des Ouvriers et des Employés de la 
Nouvelle-Calédonie (usoenc) called 
for a general labor strike, as an ulti-
matum to France to facilitate the 
Koniambo transfer. Two thousand 
protesters met outside the French High 
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to a rally at the congress hall, and the 
uc followed up with its own demon-
stration the next day. All mineral 
exports from New Caledonia were 
blocked for two weeks, and protests 
spread across the mining sites in the 
North until eramet finally agreed to 
appoint a new negotiator (ran, 5–21 
Apr 1997).
France held parliamentary elections 
in May and June that resulted in a 
Socialist victory. Both the flnks and 
Palika had refused to offer candidates, 
arguing that the main issue in the 
voting would be European Union 
membership. Palika claimed that par-
ticipation would imply integration into 
a system that condoned colonialism in 
Kanaky. Maverick nationalist Nidoish 
Naisseline of the Loyalty Islands–
based party Libération Kanak Social-
iste (lks) surprised many by urging his 
followers to vote rpcr in the national 
elections, “in the spirit of dialogue” 
(ran, 5 May 1997). Aided by the 
flnks boycott, rpcr candidate Pierre 
Frogier was elected by 61 percent of 
the votes cast in his district and joined 
Lafleur (elected for the seventh time) 
as a delegate to Paris. His chief oppo-
nent, Philippe Pentecost, was hailed by 
some as a “third force” locally. He 
won in Northern towns like Poindimié 
by attracting support from dissident 
loyalist Robert Frouin, pro-sovereignty 
labor unions, and ironically, elements 
of Palika (NC, 2 June 1997, 23 July 
1997; NH, 5–11 June 1997).
In mid-June, Wamytan led a delega-
tion to Paris to confer with new Pre-
mier Lionel Jospin and new Minister 
for Overseas Territories Jean-Jack 
Queyranne, explaining that the mining issue was jeopardizing the Matignon 
Accords signed in 1988 by Socialist 
Premier Michel Rocard. Wamytan 
liked the fact that the Socialist plat-
form in 1997 mentioned support for a 
new statute for New Caledonia, “per-
mitting its accession to sovereignty, 
according to the rhythm and methods 
fixed by the local [Matignon] part-
ners.” But the latter wording, he said, 
implied that the flnks had to “remain 
vigilant” in order to secure its goals 
(NC, 3 June 1997; ran, 17–20 June 
1997).
While in Paris, Wamytan pushed 
again for the Northern plant as a 
means of economic emancipation to 
accompany political decolonization, 
and he apparently found a sympathetic 
ear in Alain Christnacht, a counselor 
to the premier who had been French 
high commissioner to New Caledonia 
from 1991 to 1994. However, resolu-
tion of the mining issue continued to 
elude the flnks when hardliner Yves 
Rambaud was reelected general 
manager of eramet and set about 
mending relations with Paris while 
protecting sln interests in New Cale-
donia. Wamytan felt betrayed by 
Jospin’s lack of movement on 
Koniambo, and by October the flnks 
and usoenc resorted to new block-
ades, first of the Kopeto mine to pro-
test Rambaud’s visit there, and then of 
all five sln sites for a month. The 
flnks also blockaded transportation 
routes in the North for a week, until
in early November the new French 
cabinet in Paris agreed to support the 
Northern plant more forcefully (NC, 
19–20 June 1997, 12 Sep 1997; ran, 
15–23 Oct 1997, 4 Nov 1997).
Another issue was immigration. An 
444 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998estimated ten thousand people have 
migrated to New Caledonia since the 
Matignon Accords, threatening the 
employment of local residents, espe-
cially Kanak, as well as raising 
questions of voting rights. In the 
May-June elections, Louis Kotra 
Uregei, head of the powerful pro-inde-
pendence, leftist labor federation, 
Union Syndicaliste des Travailleurs 
Kanak et Exploités (ustke), had sup-
ported Leroux and Pentecost in order 
to try to stop the rpcr, which he called 
the party of immigration. The illegal 
arrival in November of 110 Chinese 
boat people led to demands for their 
repatriation from Palika, a “Stop 
Immigration” collective, and ustke. 
Despite counter-protests by humani-
tarian groups, the government interned 
the Chinese and agreed to send them 
home. An exception to this exclusion-
ist attitude was the continued migra-
tion of Polynesians from Wallis and 
Futuna, some of whom live in squatter 
camps around Noumea. The flnks 
made overtures to change its charter 
and accept its political ally in 
Congress, the Wallisian-dominated 
Rassemblement Démocratique 
Océanien (rdo), led by Aloisio Sako, 
as a full member of the nationalist 
front. In return, the rdo reaffirmed
its support of the “independence in 
association” goal of the flnks (ran, 
24 Feb 1997, 28 Apr 1997; Maclellan 
1997; NH, 5–11 June 1997). Mean-
while, three hundred members of La 
Nouvelle, an organization of the 
descendants of convicts transported to 
New Caledonia, held a ceremony in 
December to commemorate the 
centennial of the last prison ship’s arrival, in order “to lay bare taboos 
about the colonial period” (ran, 14 
Dec 1997).
The Pacific Forum, the Melanesian 
Spearhead, and the United Nations 
have all voiced support for an “act of 
self-determination” in New Caledonia, 
in compliance with the Matignon 
Accords of 1988. Yet many Caldoches 
(local-born Europeans) hope there
will not be a referendum in 1998, 
because they worry about the prece-
dent of the violent 1980s. Moreover, 
they ask what makes a Canadian 
multinational corporation (Falcon-
bridge) a better investor in local 
mining than the Société Le Nickel 
(Domergue-Schmidt 1997). Cartoons 
in the weekly newspaper Les Nouvelles 
Hebdo ridicule Kanak nationalists
and pro-independence unionists (NH, 
19–25 June 1997, 31 July–6 Aug 
1997), and despite the rise of the rdo, 
most Polynesian and Asian immigrants 
also feel that their security lies in con-
tinued French hegemony. In October, 
Queyranne told Pacific journalists in 
Canberra that, based on his recent visit 
to New Caledonia, he was optimistic 
about a peaceful resolution of the terri-
tory’s future status, because it was 
“stable”—even as the flnks was 
blockading the territory’s mines. He 
envisioned “a greater autonomy” for 
New Caledonia within the Republic 
and also announced that French finan-
cial aid to the South Pacific Commis-
sion would increase by 3 percent, a 
reminder that money talks in Oceania. 
Meanwhile, Robert Garrigos of the 
French University of the Pacific told 
the press that the mission of the 
Noumea and Pape‘ete campuses was to 
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region and thereby “create a sort of 
balance with the anglophone pres-
ence” (ran, 21 Oct 1997; NC, 2–8 Sep 
1997).
While repeatedly professing unity 
with the uc-led flnks, Palika and the 
upm continued to criticize Wamytan’s 
handling of the Northern plant issue, 
advocating a more accommodating 
approach. In an effort to overcome
the Koniambo impasse, Jospin sent 
Philippe Essig to New Caledonia in 
late August to mediate between politi-
cal opponents and mining interests. By 
early November, Essig produced a 
report that pleased the flnks: the 
French state would facilitate an imme-
diate “ad hoc” transfer of Koniambo 
to the Société Minérale Sud Pacifique 
in exchange for the Poum site, whose 
price had already been agreed on when 
the company purchased it from the 
Société le Nickel in 1995. A team of 
“internationally recognized experts” 
would, however, assess the value of the 
Koniambo vein in order to determine 
the financial “balance due” to the 
Société le Nickel beyond the worth of 
Poum. In addition, smsp-Falconbridge 
would have a deadline (2005) by 
which to conduct the feasibility studies 
needed to effect the construction of the 
Northern plant. Only if they then 
decided to go ahead with the project 
would the formal title transfers take 
place (NC, 5 Nov 1997).
With this apparent resolution of the 
mining issue, the political question 
revived. Earlier in the year, when Waia 
pressed Wamytan about whether 1998 
would simply recognize a negotiated 
agreement instead of being a real vote on sovereignty, he replied, “It’s not 
that we have dropped the [latter idea], 
but let’s say we have taken another 
route . . . it will be more a referendum 
to ratify a solution we have found 
together” (ran, 6 Feb 1997). Yet 
toward year’s end, Raphael Mapou of 
Palika expressed concern that the min-
ing impasse was retarding political dis-
cussions so badly that time might run 
out for a consensual agreement in 
1998. As the Matignon decade entered 
“the red zone,” as he called it, it could 
become necessary to prepare for a 
genuine vote on independence, perhaps 
under United Nations supervision. “It 
serves no purpose to continue to speak 
of a negotiated solution when nobody 
wants to sit around the table” (NC, 27 
Sep 1997; Maclellan 1997). Lafleur, 
like Palika, has been calling for politi-
cal dialogue all along, but the flnks 
clearly wanted to force economic 
concessions as part of the decoloniza-
tion process. Meanwhile, local Kanak 
mayors and customary chiefs have 
often opposed the expansion of 
mining, warning against environmen-
tal pollution and loss of communal 
lands. Despite the flnks victory in the 
North, Kanaky remains very much a 
work in progress, and 1998 is unlikely 
to be dull.
david a chappell
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Papua New Guinea
By any measure this was an extraordi-
nary year in Papua New Guinea, 
where dramatic and often tragic events 
have become commonplace in recent 
times. The government’s latest attempt 
to force a military solution to the long-
standing Bougainville secessionist 
crisis, this time with the help of foreign 
mercenaries, backfired badly. It precip-
itated a constitutional crisis when the 
Defence Force commander abruptly 
withdrew his support for the plan and 
elements of the military moved to 
expel the mercenaries. Veteran politi-
cian Sir Julius Chan was obliged to 
stand down as prime minister, in the 
face of overwhelming public support 
for the defiant soldiers, and lost his 
parliamentary seat in the general elec-
tion later in the year. Unfortunately, 
his successor, Bill Skate, did little to 
restore public faith in the badly dis-
credited political system. He rose to 
power by forming a coalition with the 
remnants of the Chan government, 
people whose integrity he had vehe-
mently attacked in the run up to the 
general election. Later he was exposed 
on secretly recorded videotapes claim-
ing, among other things, to be the 
“godfather” of Port Moresby’s notori-
ous raskol gangs. The mercenary 
debacle did, however, provide a welcome boost for the peace process in 
Bougainville, and by the end of the 
year most of the elements of the so-
called Burnham Declaration ham-
mered out in New Zealand in July 
were in place and yielding positive 
results. Meanwhile, another disaster, 
this one natural in origin, was gather-
ing momentum throughout the coun-
try as the worst drought in more than 
a century caused extensive crop fail-
ures, putting many rural Papua New 
Guineans at risk.
Government officials and military 
leaders have long been frustrated by 
their inability to combat the guerrilla 
tactics of the Bougainville Revolution-
ary Army (bra) and acutely conscious 
of their dependence on Australia for 
military training and equipment. In the 
face of Canberra’s increasing reluc-
tance to support the military effort on 
Bougainville, Defence Minister Math-
ias Ijape began to seek private sources 
of military hardware in early 1996. A 
foreign business associate, with whom 
he had worked on an earlier plan to 
establish an elite police unit, put him 
in touch with Tim Spicer, a London-
based director of a military consul-
tancy company soon to be called Sand-
line International. In April 1996, Ijape, 
Secretary for Defence James Melegepa, 
and Defence Force Commander Jerry 
Singirok met in Cairns with Spicer and 
another London-based consultant to 
discuss Papua New Guinea’s military 
needs. Spicer then prepared a proposal 
called Project Contravene, which was 
presented to Singirok and Ijape later 
the same month. In December, after 
Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta 
became interested in the idea, Spicer 
visited Papua New Guinea for further 
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detailed report for a fee of 
us$250,000. He delivered the 
expanded report at the end of Decem-
ber 1996.
Project Contravene proposed a 
“high speed covert military operation” 
employing the “precise and surgical 
application of combat power” with 
two main objectives on the island of 
Bougainville. The first was to “neutral-
ize” the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army by silencing its broadcast 
station, Radio Free Bougainville, and 
killing or capturing its senior com-
manders, named in the report as 
Francis Ona, Joseph Kabui, Sam 
Kauona, and Ismail Toarama. The 
second objective was to “seize and 
hold” the giant copper and gold mine 
at Panguna, closed by the crisis in 
1989. The attacks would be preceded 
by two preparatory phases, one to 
train the Special Forces Unit of the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
(pngdf) and “a small detachment of 
resistance fighters” for the operation, 
and the other to gather intelligence on 
bra locations, and cut off transport 
and communications links with neigh-
boring Solomon Islands. The subse-
quent contract between the state of 
Papua New Guinea and Sandline, 
signed at the end of January 1997, 
required Sandline to provide the train-
ing, gather the necessary intelligence, 
conduct the military operation in con-
junction with the Defence Force, and 
provide unspecified “follow-up opera-
tional support.” It would also supply a 
package of military hardware featuring 
two Russian-built mi-24 attack heli-
copters and two mi-17 transport heli-
copters, a range of ordinance including missiles, as well as sophisticated night 
vision and remote-sensing equipment. 
These services, many of which appear 
to have been subcontracted to a large 
South Africa–based security company, 
Executive Outcomes, would be pro-
vided at a total cost of us$36 million.
The plan appeared seriously flawed. 
As Anthony Regan has argued, it 
showed little understanding of the 
nature of the crisis on Bougainville and 
simply assumed that military action 
could and would bring it to an end 
(Regan 1997). The military had not 
succeeded on Bougainville, the report 
implied, partly because of tactical 
errors but mainly due to inadequate 
training and equipment. More bizarre 
was the suggestion that Australia and 
New Zealand had conspired to pro-
long the crisis to keep Papua New 
Guinea from realizing its full economic 
and regional potential. Nor does it 
seem likely that the more immediate 
military objectives could have been 
achieved as planned. As the Defence 
Force discovered in August 1994, it is 
relatively easy to seize the Panguna 
mine site, but securing this huge moun-
taintop facility and its vast network of 
associated infrastructure against subse-
quent attack would require an enor-
mous commitment of security 
personnel and resources. This part of 
the plan could only succeed if earlier 
strategic attacks against the five “key 
targets” succeeded in “neutralizing” 
the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. 
It would have been relatively easy to 
destroy the one “hard” target on the 
Sandline list, the radio transmitter, 
although it surely could have been 
rebuilt elsewhere without too much 
trouble. Given the rugged nature of the 
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bra soldiers from ordinary villagers, it 
is difficult to imagine how the bra 
commanders could have been tracked 
down, positively identified, and 
eliminated through some “surgical” 
application of “combat power.”
Even if all of these individuals were 
removed, surgically or otherwise,
other disenchanted Bougainvilleans 
might well emerge to continue the 
struggle.
The small group of senior Papua 
New Guinea officials involved in the 
Sandline deal may have been aware of 
these problems, but hoped that the 
military operation (codenamed Oyster) 
would at least force bra leaders to the 
negotiating table. The key player was, 
of course, Prime Minister Chan, who 
initially rejected Sandline’s proposal in 
September 1996, but apparently 
changed his mind after meeting with 
Spicer in January 1997. Chan was 
extremely eager to resolve the Bou-
gainville crisis, having seen numerous 
military and political initiatives yield a 
series of humiliating setbacks and 
defeats. He was also acutely aware 
that, if not resolved, the issue could 
jeopardize plans to consolidate his 
political position in the upcoming 
general elections. Chan may well have 
been impressed by Spicer’s military 
credentials and “can-do” attitude, 
especially after years of dealing with 
an unwieldy military establishment at 
home and unsympathetic officials in 
Australia. Certainly, Spicer’s proposal 
was pitched to appeal to these con-
cerns, attributing a negative role to 
Australia, emphasizing the “immense” 
political rewards that victory would 
bring, and promising to complete the operation before the current Parlia-
ment dissolved in April.
Events moved fast once Chan 
decided to back the proposal, which 
was endorsed by cabinet on 15 Janu-
ary. Despite serious concerns raised by 
the officials who reviewed Spicer’s 
draft contract, the agreement was 
executed two weeks later and us$18 
million (fifty percent of the contract 
price) transferred to Sandline. By mid-
February, just a month after cabinet 
approved the operation, some seventy 
foreign mercenaries were training with 
the Special Forces Unit in Wewak. 
However, by the end of March the 
mercenaries were gone, Operation 
Oyster had been abandoned, and 
Papua New Guinea was reeling from 
its worst political crisis since indepen-
dence in 1975.
Initial public reaction to news of the 
Sandline deal, which first broke on 22 
February, was relatively subdued. 
Although some Papua New Guinean 
politicians and community groups 
were quick to voice their opposition, 
the loudest protests came from govern-
ment and media sources in Australia, 
with Prime Minister John Howard 
declaring that the use of mercenaries 
was completely unacceptable. At first 
Chan attempted to downplay the sig-
nificance of the contract, claiming that 
Sandline employees were merely pro-
viding training services and would not 
be deployed on Bougainville. Austra-
lia, he complained, was meddling in 
Papua New Guinea’s domestic affairs, 
a claim that received support from 
prominent opposition leaders. But 
domestic pressures proved to be 
Chan’s undoing. On 16 March, 
Defence Force personnel under the 
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launched Rausim Kwik, an operation 
designed to round up and expel the 
Sandline mercenaries. The following 
day Defence Force Commander Briga-
dier General Singirok went on national 
radio to explain his opposition to the 
Sandline contract, report the detention 
of the mercenaries, and call for the 
resignation of Prime Minister Chan, 
Deputy Prime Minister Haiveta, and 
Defence Minister Ijape.
Singirok’s lengthy statement to the 
nation raised rather more questions 
than it answered. He was clear about 
his actions, announcing that he had 
“canceled all further activities” with 
Sandline. His demands were also clear: 
the prime minister, deputy prime min-
ister, and defense minister must resign 
within forty-eight hours and face a 
commission of inquiry, or he would 
ask citizens to “join hands to force 
them to resign.” He indicated several 
reasons for taking these actions, which 
Chan described as “gross insubordina-
tion bordering on treason.” First, the 
planned military operation on Bou-
gainville was unacceptable. It would 
inflict unnecessary levels of human and 
environmental damage, aggravate 
rather than solve the crisis, and cause 
people throughout the country to turn 
against the government and the 
Defence Force. Second, the contract 
with Sandline was flawed. It had been 
pushed through without proper scru-
tiny and involved inflated prices for 
obsolete equipment. Third, by involv-
ing foreign nationals on a temporary 
basis at such a high cost (equivalent to 
one-third of the Defence Force’s 
annual budget) the initiative served to 
undermine the credibility and profes-sionalism of the permanent Defence 
Force. Fourth, the actions and motives 
of the three key government ministers 
in the Sandline affair were highly ques-
tionable. According to Singirok, they 
wanted to reopen the Panguna mine 
regardless of the human costs of doing 
so, and may have been benefiting 
financially from the Sandline deal.
There is no doubt that Singirok was 
concerned about the devastating 
impact of Operation Oyster, and sin-
cere in his belief that military action 
would not solve the Bougainville crisis. 
Yet the evidence suggests that he was 
familiar with the contents of the Sand-
line proposal from its beginnings in 
1996, including the nature of the 
equipment involved, and subsequently 
facilitated its development and imple-
mentation. It could be that he became 
increasingly disenchanted when his 
advice was effectively ignored in the 
final stages of the negotiations, when 
the Sandline training program yielded 
nothing new, and when it became 
apparent that senior politicians were 
engineering some sort of secret deal 
involving shares in Bougainville 
Copper Limited. Certainly, the
charges of underhand dealing and 
corruption raised by Singirok struck a 
chord with the general public and led 
to a powerful groundswell of support 
for his stand. Ironically, although no 
hard evidence to corroborate these 
charges of wrongdoing had emerged 
by the end of 1997, there was evidence 
that Singirok himself had accepted 
money under dubious circumstances. 
In an article in the Weekend Austra-
lian, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, the 
journalist who first broke the Sandline 
story, revealed that Singirok had 
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twelve months preceding the Sandline 
crisis from a London dealer who had 
been supplying arms to Papua New 
Guinea for some years.
It soon became apparent that 
Singirok had the upper hand in the 
ensuing standoff with Chan. Although 
dismissed as commander, he clearly 
had the support of most of the mili-
tary, whose Port Morseby barracks 
became the focal point for large public 
demonstrations over the next three 
days. The rallies were organized by 
university students and community 
action groups, and tensions ran high 
when fringe elements took advantage 
of the situation to smash shop win-
dows and loot merchandise. The worst 
incident occurred on the afternoon of 
20 March, when police used tear gas 
to disperse demonstrators outside 
Murray Barracks and discharged auto-
matic weapons in the general direction 
of civilians fleeing into the military 
compound. Intent on retaliation, some 
soldiers tried to break into the armory 
but were restrained at gunpoint by 
their superiors. Also under intense 
pressure from Australia, whose prime 
minister sent a special envoy to Port 
Moresby, Chan grudgingly bowed to 
the inevitable on 20 March. He sus-
pended the Sandline contract and 
announced a judicial inquiry into the 
circumstances surrounding the engage-
ment of the company.
However, these actions by no means 
satisfied the critics. They continued to 
demand Chan’s resignation, a move 
that appeared to have the support of 
Governor General Sir Wiwa Korowi, 
who noted that the “termites of greed, 
corruption, manipulation, selfishness and abuse of public office” had 
reached “alarming proportions” (PC, 
19 March 1997, 3). After several days 
of negotiations behind closed doors, 
and with demonstrations continuing in 
urban centers across the country, Par-
liament convened on 25 March to con-
sider a motion calling on Chan to 
resign. The large crowd that had gath-
ered outside the building became angry 
when the motion was defeated, leading 
those inside to fear for their safety. 
Parliament House remained secure, 
but the presence of armed soldiers 
controlling traffic in and out of the 
building led to speculation that a mili-
tary coup was under way. Late that 
night Major Walter Enuma, the leader 
of Operation Rausim Kwik, arrived to 
assure political leaders that there was 
no bid to seize power, and managed to 
calm a group of protesters intent on 
entering the building. On the after-
noon of the following day, 26 March, 
Chan told Parliament that he, Haiveta, 
and Ijape would “stand aside” pending 
the results of the Sandline inquiry. The 
next day cabinet reversed the order of 
the two dominant parties in the ruling 
coalition by selecting Pangu Pati’s John 
Giheno as acting prime minister, with 
Andrew Baing of the People’s Progress 
Party as his deputy.
Since there was no attempt to take 
over the government, the actions of 
Singirok and other military leaders 
during March 1997 did not constitute 
a coup (May 1997, 104). Nevertheless, 
illegal acts had clearly been committed, 
and various state agencies began to 
move against those involved. A 
Defence Force board of inquiry was set 
up to investigate possible wrongdoing 
by defense personnel, but its activities 
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a new judicial inquiry into the Sandline 
affair. Singirok was dismissed from the 
armed forces and later charged with 
sedition for his actions on 17 March. 
Meanwhile, Major Enuma, first cata-
pulted to prominence by his role in 
Operation Rausim Kwik, was back in 
the news at the end of July, when he 
was arrested and charged with raising 
an illegal force to influence the results 
of the general elections in an Enga elec-
torate. On 28 July a group of armed 
soldiers forcibly released Enuma from 
the cells at the Boroko police station, 
and subsequently placed new Defence 
Force Commander Brigadier General 
Leo Niua under house arrest at Mur-
ray Barracks. Five officers attached to 
the Special Forces Unit, including 
Enuma, were later charged by a mili-
tary court with mutiny for these 
actions. Perhaps more troubling were 
the police raids in early May on the 
offices of several community organiza-
tions active in Sandline-related pro-
tests, and the subsequent arrest of their 
leaders on charges of illegal assembly.
As usual, the national elections, 
held 14–28 June, attracted a large 
number of candidates, an average of 
about twenty for each of the 109 par-
liamentary seats. Also as usual, the 
decisive issues tended to be local ones. 
However, the Sandline affair was a fac-
tor in the 1997 elections, undoubtedly 
contributing to the ouster of Sir Julius 
Chan from the New Ireland electorate 
he had represented for twenty-four 
years, and to the election of several 
new members of Parliament who had 
been active in the Sandline protests. 
About half of the incumbent members, 
including fourteen cabinet ministers, lost their seats, and about one-third of 
the members of the new House had no 
declared party affiliation.
Those who hoped that the elections 
would restore some of the damage 
inflicted by the troubling political 
events of the first part of the year were 
soon disappointed. Some observers 
expected that veteran politician and 
“father of the nation” Sir Michael 
Somare could successfully build a 
coalition around the eleven elected 
members of his National Alliance 
party, and relegate the discredited 
Pangu and People’s Progress parties to 
the opposition benches. However, on 
22 July the new Parliament convened 
and voted Bill Skate in as prime minis-
ter by an overwhelming margin over 
Somare. When earlier negotiations 
between Somare’s National Alliance 
and Skate’s People’s National Congress 
broke down because neither man 
would concede the prime ministership, 
Skate quickly agreed to a partnership 
with Pangu and the People’s Progress 
Party. In doing so, observed the Aus-
tralian Financial Review, the country’s 
first Papuan prime minister “aban-
doned every pledge he had made, every 
policy he had advocated and every crit-
icism he had uttered against the PPP-
Pangu Government” (AFR, 23 July 
1997). Just ten days before, Skate had 
stated categorically that he “did not 
want to be involved with their dirty 
politics. . . . We are totally against the 
activities and decisions of Pangu and 
PPP. We would be going against our 
people’s wishes if we began associating 
with these parties” (National, 23 July 
1997). It was even more surprising to 
see several newly elected members 
closely associated with activist com-
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secretary-general of melsol, Peti Lafa-
nama, join the government ranks 
alongside returning Deputy Prime 
Minister Chris Haiveta and other indi-
viduals they had bitterly opposed 
earlier in the year.
Less than a week after assuming 
office, Skate ordered the police to sus-
pend action against military personnel 
and others who had opposed the Sand-
line deal, ostensibly as an attempt to 
reduce tensions within the Defence 
Force. However, his intervention 
appeared rather less impartial when it 
was later revealed that he was related 
to Major Walter Enuma, and may have 
known in advance of the plan to free 
him from the Boroko cells. On 10 
August Skate announced expanded 
terms of reference for the new Sandline 
Commission of Inquiry headed by Jus-
tice Kubulan Los, but amended them 
again on 19 September. Among other 
things, the commission was asked to 
investigate whether there were any 
secret financial kickbacks or business 
deals associated with the Sandline con-
tract, and whether certain individuals, 
including Haiveta, had traded in 
Bougainville Copper Limited shares 
when the government was planning to 
purchase the mining company early in 
1997. Singirok’s actions during the 
March crisis, as well as the possibility 
that he had received money from arms 
dealers, were also issues to be probed.
In November Skate faced what 
appeared to be a major political set-
back when an Australian television sta-
tion broadcast video extracts showing 
the prime minister discussing payoffs 
for politicians and journalists, and 
boasting about his connections with criminal gangs in Port Moresby. “I can 
be very ruthless,” he was heard to say, 
“I don’t need money . . . but if I tell my 
gang members to kill, they kill. . . . 
There’s no other godfather . . . I’m the 
godfather.” He also described how he 
once told his “boys” to grab a man 
who tried to attack him, and how they 
drove him to a beach and “cut him to 
pieces.” The tapes were secretly made 
by Mujo Sefa, an Australian business-
man with interests in Papua New 
Guinea, who claimed to have helped 
broker the deal that resulted in Skate’s 
election as prime minister. The release 
of the videotapes by Sefa, who appar-
ently had fallen out of Skate’s favor, 
immediately provoked a barrage of 
demands for Skate to resign, and a 
crisis within the coalition government. 
Citing a conspiracy to bring him 
down, Skate fired Haiveta as deputy 
prime minister, who then withdrew his 
Pangu Pati from the government. Skate 
claimed that Haiveta had set him up by 
bringing him to Sefa’s office and get-
ting him drunk. Haiveta denied the 
charge, but did not deny that he was 
present when the tapes were made. In a 
consummate demonstration of prag-
matic politics, Haiveta eventually 
agreed to rejoin the government and 
Skate announced that there was no 
need for a public inquiry into the sor-
did affair. By the end of the year 
Skate’s support in Parliament had actu-
ally increased, as he managed to 
recruit three prominent figures, Sir 
Rabbie Namaliu, Sir Mekere Morauta, 
and Masket Iangalio, into his cabinet 
(Vulum 1998c, 27).
The inability of Papua New 
Guinea’s state structures to deliver 
essential services was dramatically 
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was struck by an extended drought 
associated with the El Niño weather 
system phenomenon. All nineteen 
provinces were affected by the lack of 
rain, which devastated subsistence and 
cash crops alike in the second half of 
the year. It also caused the Fly River to 
shrink, stranding shipping and inter-
rupting production at the giant Ok 
Tedi mine. By the end of the year, the 
Australian aid agency AusAID esti-
mated that as many as 1.5 million 
people, more than a third of the popu-
lation, were without adequate food 
and water, and at least five hundred 
people had died from starvation or 
drought related disease. About 
260,000 people were in a critical, life-
threatening situation, and a further 
980,000 were approaching that condi-
tion. Furthermore, according to one of 
the authors of the AusAID report, 
“The worst is about to happen” 
(Vulum 1998b, 19).
Although Skate announced that up 
to 30 million kina would be set aside 
to deal with the problem, it was clear 
that nothing like that level of funding 
had been made available by the end of 
the year. It was also clear that Papua 
New Guinea simply lacked the admin-
istrative and logistical capacity to 
deliver the necessary assistance to the 
rural areas. The relief campaign, which 
involved the extensive use of helicopter 
transport, was effectively orchestrated 
and implemented by military and civil-
ian teams from Australia. Even though 
the effort was able to deliver some 1.2 
million kilograms of food to about 
sixty thousand people, many more 
were left hungry. Even when rainfall 
resumes, it will take time to restore gardens to full production. The pros-
pects for rural Papua New Guinea in 
the first half of 1998 look grim indeed 
(Vulum 1998a, 1998b; Field 1998).
The Sandline catastrophe did create 
the conditions for significant advances 
toward a lasting peace on the war-
ravaged island of Bougainville. The 
collapse of this initiative effectively 
ruled out any possibility of a military 
solution to the nine-year-old crisis, at 
least in the immediate future (Regan 
1997, 64–72). Furthermore, when 
members of the new Skate government 
turned their attention back to the 
possibility of a negotiated settlement, 
the peace process was already well 
under way. This was largely as a result 
of a concerted effort by senior New 
Zealand officials, who managed to 
persuade leaders from all of the key 
factions on Bougainville to come to 
Burnham army camp near Christ-
church, New Zealand, to discuss their 
differences. The two weeks of peace 
talks in July resulted in the Burnham 
Declaration, which committed the 
parties to a process they hoped would 
produce a lasting solution to the crisis. 
The leaders called for a negotiated 
ceasefire with the Papua New Guinea 
government, the lifting of restrictions 
on the free movement of goods and 
people in and out of Bougainville and 
on the island itself, the complete with-
drawal of the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force, and the introduction of 
a neutral peacekeeping force 
(National, 22 July 1997). The meeting 
was hailed as a great success, and in a 
gesture of goodwill, the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army released five 
Defence Force soldiers whom they had 
held captive since September 1996. 
454 the contemporary pacific • fall 1998There had been numerous high-profile 
attempts to free the prisoners, involv-
ing prominent figures such as Sir 
Michael Somare and Bougainville 
Member of Parliament John Momis.
Meanwhile, the central government 
had also been working on a compre-
hensive peace strategy. This initiative 
was launched in late January 1997 by 
Peter Barter, the minister for provincial 
and local government affairs in the 
Chan administration, who was 
alarmed about the implications of the 
recently approved Sandline proposal. 
He chaired a committee that brought 
together representatives of the key 
national agencies involved in Bougain-
ville. The committee outlined a 
strategy for peace in a detailed docu-
ment that was eventually adopted by 
cabinet in the dying days of the Chan 
government, and endorsed by the 
Skate government in August 1997. The 
work of the Barter committee, and its 
extensive discussions with interested 
parties on Bougainville, did much to 
rekindle interest in the process by 
which peace might be achieved. It also 
provided the Skate government with a 
sound basis for negotiations with the 
rebel factions on Bougainville, which 
got underway in late September.
These talks were also held at Burn-
ham, and included delegations from 
the national government, and the main 
legally recognized authority on the 
island, the Bougainville Transitional 
Government, as well as the breakaway 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army and 
its political wing, the Bougainville 
Interim Government. On 10 October 
the Burnham Truce was announced. 
The parties agreed to an interim truce 
and to work toward a formal agree-ment that would make the truce per-
manent. They also agreed to restore 
freedom of movement on the island, 
and to establish regular dialogue 
between the security forces, bra 
commanders, Resistance Force com-
manders, and local leaders. The agree-
ment was endorsed by Skate, who 
described it as an “important step for-
ward,” and generally welcomed it as 
representing the best prospect for an 
end to the Bougainville crisis so far. By 
the end of November, a 260-strong 
Truce Monitoring Group, which 
included soldiers and civilians from 
New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, and 
Vanuatu, had been deployed on Bou-
gainville. The unarmed group, domi-
nated by New Zealanders, was warmly 
received, and by the end of the year 
there had been no violations of the 
ceasefire agreement.
One troubling aspect of the peace 
process as it progressed in 1997 was 
the nonparticipation of the self-styled 
president of the Republic of Bougain-
ville, Francis Ona, who had launched 
the secessionist rebellion in the late 
1980s. He refused to attend either 
round of talks in New Zealand and 
dismissed the resulting agreements, 
which he said were destined to fail. 
Ona has consistently maintained that 
he will not accept anything less than 
full independence for Bougainville, and 
is fully aware that the eventual politi-
cal outcome of the present process is 
likely to be some form of autonomy 
for Bougainville within the state of 
Papua New Guinea. Whereas most 
Bougainvilleans, including most bra 
commanders, now seem willing to 
compromise their political demands in 
the interest of peace, Ona and his 
political reviews • melanesia 455group appear determined to continue 
the struggle. As long as they do, the 
road to a lasting peace is unlikely to be 
smooth.
terence wesley-smith
THANKS TO Bill Standish for useful 
materials. For information on the 
Sandline controversy I have relied 
heavily on Challenging the State: The 
Sandline Affair in Papua New Guinea, 
edited by Sinclair Dinnen, Ron May, 
and Anthony Regan, and especially the 
excellent chronology of events 
presented in chapter 2. The appendix 
contains a selection of key Sandline 
documents, including the Project 
Contravene proposal and the Papua 
New Guinea–Sandline International 
Agreement.
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